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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Michael Eugene Koch appeals from the judgment of conviction imposed 
upon the jury's verdicts finding him guilty of four counts of lewd conduct with a 
minor under sixteen. 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Koch's daughter, T.K., was a classmate and friend of thirteen-year old 
C.C. (Tr., Vol. I, p.278, L25 - p.279, L24.) During her 8th grade year, C.C. 
began to have problems at home. (Tr., Vol. I. p.280, L24 - p.282, L2.) Her 
adoptive father drank heavily, her parents often fought, and her mother 
eventually moved out of the house. (Tr., Vol. I, p.223, L2 - p.225, L21; p.229, 
Ls.6-16; p.280, L24 - p.282, L2.) C.C. began to spend more time at the home 
of the Kochs', with whom she became close. (Tr., Vol. I, p.228, L19 - p.230, 
L7; p.282, L16 - p.284, L9.) 
Koch and his wife, Salina, had open and liberal sexual attitudes. (Tr., Vol. 
I, p.287, L 12 - p.288, L.23; p.300, L20 - p.309, L24.) C.C. observed vibrators 
and pornography displayed openly in the Kochs' house. (Id.) A "sex swing" hung 
overtly from the ceiling of the master bedroom. (Tr., Vol. I, p.302, L9 - p.303, 
L15; p.641, Ls.21-23.) The Kochs often discussed sexual matters in C.C.'s 
presence, and purchased vibrators for C.C. and T.K.. (Tr., Vol. I, p.288, LS.17-
23; p.299, L 19 - p.309, L24.) 
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Eventually, Koch began to engage in detailed discussions with C.C. about 
his marriage and sex life. (Tr., Vol. I, p.289, L.7 - p.290, L.8; p.302, L.25 -
p.305, L.10.) Koch purchased C.C. lace underwear from Victoria's Secret. (Tr., 
p.312, L.25 - p.314, L.13.) He also told C.C. that he loved her and wanted to 
marry her. (Tr., Vol. I, p.317, Ls.18-19.) 
In the spring of C.C.'s 8th grade year, Koch drove C.C. to a street 
alongside a subdivision, where he digitally penetrated C.C.'s vagina. (Tr., Vol. I, 
p.297, Ls.15-20.) C.C. then performed oral sex on Koch. (Tr., Vol. I, p.297, L.19 
- p.298, L.4.) Koch implored C.C. to keep their sexual activities secret. (Tr., Vol. 
I, p.298, Ls.5-15.) On another occasion, Koch picked C.C. up at her house 
where was she home sick from school and took her to his house where he twice 
engaged in sexual intercourse with her, including once while C.C. was in the sex 
swing. (Tr., Vol. I, p.319, L.8 - p.325, L.6.) Koch also had sex with C.C. on 
another occasion while his family was attending a Girl Scout play. (Tr., Vol. I, 
p.326, L.5 - p.327, L.8.) Sometime later, C.C. stopped spending time at Kochs' 
house and ended her friendship with T.K .. (Tr., Vol. I, p.329, L.7 - p.354, L.3.) 
In the fall of her 9th grade year, C.C. took the glass out of a picture frame 
and slit her wrists after a fight with her mother. (Tr., Vol. I, p.353, L.4 - p.354, 
L.11.) C.C. was admitted to Intermountain Hospital where she was treated for 
five days. (Tr., Vol. I, p.354, Ls.12-16.) There, C.C. disclosed her sexual 
relationship with Koch. (Tr., Vol. I, p.354, p.17 - p.334, L.2.) 
A law enforcement investigation commenced. (Tr., Vol. I, p.355, L.18 -
p.357, L.6.) Officers arranged a confrontation call between C.C. and Koch. (Tr., 
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Vol. I, p.357, L.12 - p.365, L.3.) In the recorded call, C.C. confronted Koch about 
their sexual relationship. (See generally state's exhibit 19.) In the course of the 
call, Koch did not expressly admit sexual contact with C.C., but also did not 
refute C.C.'s accusations. (Id.) He also expressed his love for C.C. and his fear 
that he was going to jail. (Id.) 
A grand jury indicted Koch on four counts of lewd conduct with a minor 
under sixteen. (R., pp.26-27.) After a trial, the jury found Koch guilty on all four 
counts. (R., pp.182-185.) The district court imposed a concurrent unified 25-
year sentence with five years fixed on each count. (R., pp.199-204.) Koch timely 
appealed. (R., pp.216-219.) 
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ISSUES 
Koch states the issues on appeal as: 
A. Did the court err by denying Mr. Koch's discovery request for a 
written summary of expected testimony along with the facts and 
data supporting that opinion from the state's expert witness? 
B. Did one of the many trial and evidentiary errors by the court deprive 
Mr. Koch of his constitutional due process right to a [fair] trial? 
1. Did the court err in denying Mr. Koch's objection during 
opening statements? 
2. Did the court err in admitting a test message allegedly from 
Mr. Koch to Lisa Conn due to lack of foundation? 
3. Did the court err in admitting irrelevant evidence that Mr. 
Koch did not enjoy oral sex with his wife? 
4. Did the court err in admitting irrelevant evidence that C.C. 
decided not to attend the special charter school she was 
admitted to because she did not want to see members of the 
Koch family there? 
5. Did the court err in admitting emails and text messages 
allegedly from Mr. Koch to C.C. due to lack of foundation? 
6. Did the court err by failing to strike non-responsive 
testimony? 
7. Did the court err by admitting evidence of prior statements 
for purposes of impeachment where the witness did not deny 
making the prior statement? 
8. Did the court err by admitting the audio recording of a 
"confront call" due to lack of foundation? 
C. Alternatively, did the cumulative effect of the above errors deprive 
Mr. Koch of a fair trial? 
(Appellant's brief, pp.3":4) 
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The state rephrases the issues on appeal as: 
1. Has Koch failed to show that the district court abused its discretion in 
denying his discovery request? 
2. Has Koch failed to establish reversible error in the state's opening 
statement? 
3. Has Koch failed to show that the district court abused its discretion in 
overruling Koch's foundation objections to the admission of several text 
and email messages? 
4. Has Koch failed to show that the district court abused its discretion in 
overruling Koch's relevance objections? 
5. Has Koch failed to show that the district court abused its discretion in 
overruling Koch's objections that certain testimony was non-responsive to 
the corresponding question? 
, 6. Has Koch failed to show that the district Court abused its discretion in 
ruling that Detective McGilvery's testimony regarding his interview with 
Salina Koch was inconsistent with Koch's prior testimony about the 
interview? 
7. Has Koch failed to show that the district court abused its discretion in 
overruling Koch's foundation objection to the admission of an audio 
recording of the confrontation call? 




Koch Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Discretion In 
Denying His Discovery Request 
A. Introduction 
Koch contends that the district court abused its discretion when it 
concluded that the state complied with the disclosure requirements of I.C.R. 
16(b)(7) regarding expert witness Mydell Yeager. (Appellant's brief, pp.4-10.) 
Specifically, Koch contends that the district court erred because the state failed 
to disclose Yeager's opinions, and the facts and data for those opinions. (Id.) 
Koch's claim fails because the record reveals that the state disclosed a 
written summary outlining Yeager's opinions and expected testimony. Further, 
the state was not required to disclose any "facts or data" because Yeager's 
expert testimony did not rely on any facts or data generated by this case, and 
because her well-established opinions regarding child sex abuse disclosure were 
not generated from any identifiable data source. Koch has therefore failed to 
show that the district court abused its discretion. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Whether disclosure of information is required by I.C.R. 16 is reviewed for 
an abuse of discretion. See State v. Wilson, 142 Idaho 431, 128 P.3d 968 (Ct. 
App.2006). 
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C. The State Complied With The Disclosure Requirements Of I.C.R. 16(b)(7) 
Idaho Criminal Rule 16(b)(7) requires the state to provide, upon written 
request, a written summary or report of any expert testimony that the state 
intends to introduce at trial. The summary must describe "the witness's opinions, 
the facts and data for those opinions, and the witness's qualifications." I.C.R. 
16(b)(7). 
In this case, in response to Koch's I.C.R. 16(b)(7) discovery request, the 
state disclosed the following written summary regarding expert witness Mydell 
Yeager: 
Ms. Yeager's curriculum vitae is attached. She'll testify to 
the dynamics of delayed disclosure as it relates to child sexual 
abuse. The state intends to elicit expert testimony from Mydell 
Yeager regarding behavior of children who have been sexually 
abused and Ms. Yeager will testify that it is rare that a child 
immediately discloses their sexual abuse especially when they 
know the perpetrator. Ms. Yeager will testify about the dynamics of 
child sexual abuse as it relates to grooming a victim, keeping the 
abuse secret, the effects and threats on whether a child chooses to 
disclose. 
(Tr., Vol. I, pA8, Ls.12-25.) 
This disclosure, and the attached curriculum vitae, was sufficient to satisfy 
the I.C.R. 16(b)(7) requirement that the state disclose "the witness's opinions." 
This disclosure sufficiently informed Koch that the state would elicit expert 
testimony about why sex abuse victims like C.C. might not immediately disclose 
sexual abuse, and about the dynamics of the type of grooming behavior Koch 
engaged in. 
7 
The state was not required to produce any "facts or data" for these 
opinions because no such facts or data existed. Yeager did not examine, 
analyze, or present any conclusions regarding any evidence in this case, nor had 
she ever even met C.C. (Trial Tr., Vol. II, p.26, L.19 - p.27, L.1.) Further, the 
record shows that Yeager's general expert testimony about child sex abuse was 
not based on any particular or specifically identifiable data source, but on her 
years of experience as an expert in the field. In this case, the "facts and data" for 
Yeager's opinion was her education, work history, and training, the nature of 
each of which was disclosed to Koch. 
Yeager testified that she had been a sex abuse counselor for 27 years, 
has a master's degree in counseling, and had participated in specialized training. 
(Tr., Vol. I, p.694, L.19 - p.696, L.16.) She did not review any materials in 
preparation for her testimony. (Tr., Vol. II, p.26, L.24 - p.27, L.1.) She testified 
that her opinions regarding delayed sex abuse victim disclosure came from "lots 
and lots of different data," and "lots" of published documents. (Tr., Vol. II, p.27, 
Ls.10-21.) 
Idaho Criminal Rule 16(b)(7) did not require the state to attempt to compile 
an all-encompassing list of the various sources that supported Yeager's general 
opinions. Koch had the opportunity to challenge Yeager's qualifications as an 
expert, to cross-examine Yeager on the basis of her testimony and expertise, or 
to present his own expert testimony to either attack Yeager's opinions, or to 
present contrary ones. Koch also had the opportunity to challenge Yeager's 
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qualifications as an expert witness, or to object to any of Yeager's testimony on 
the ground that it was outside the scope of the state's disclosure. 
The state's disclosures regarding Yeager's expert testimony complied with 
the requirements of I.C.R. 16(b)(7). Koch has therefore failed to show that the 
district court abused its discretion by declining to require the state to present 
additional "facts and data" regarding Yeager's testimony. 
II. 
Koch Has Failed To Establish Reversible Error In The State's Opening Statement 
A. Introduction 
Koch contends that the district court erred in overruling his objection to 
comments made by the prosecutor during the state's opening statement. 
(Appellant's brief, pp.10-11.) Specifically, Koch contends that the court should 
have sustained his objection to the prosecutor's statement that Koch talked to 
C.C. about "things he should have never shared with a 13-year-old girl." (Id.) 
Koch's argument fails because the prosecutor's statement was not improper. 
Further, even if the district court erred by overruling Koch's objection, any such 
error was harmless. 
B. The Prosecutor's Statement Was Proper 
The purpose and scope of an opening statement was outlined in State v. 
Griffith, 97 Idaho 52, 539 P.2d 604 (1975): 
Opening statements serve to inform the jury of the issues of 
the case and briefly outline the evidence each litigant intends to 
introduce to support his allegations or defenses, as the case may 
be. While counsel should be allowed latitude in making an opening 
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statement, the trial court may limit the scope of that statement in 
the exercise of its discretion. Generally, opening remarks should 
be confined to a brief summary of evidence counsel expects to 
introduce on behalf of his client's case-in-chief. Counsel should not 
at that time attempt to impeach or otherwise argue the merits of 
evidence that the opposing side has or will present. 
Griffith, 97 Idaho at 56 (footnotes omitted); see also State v. Priest, 128 Idaho 6, 
13,909 P.2d 624, 631 (Ct. App. 1995); State v. Timmons, 145 Idaho 279,287, 
178 P.3d 644, 652 (Ct. App. 2007). 
During the state's opening statement, the prosecutor described the 
grooming behavior engaged in by Koch - how Koch would snuggle with C.C, rub 
her back and her hair, and tell her how beautiful she was. (Tr., Vol. I, p.198, 
Ls.1-19.) The prosecutor then stated that Koch "started talking to [C.C.] about 
things he should have never shared with a 13-year-old girl." (Tr., Vol. I, p.198, 
Ls.16-19.) The district court overruled Koch's objection that the prosecutor's 
characterization of Koch's conversations with C.C. was "argumentative." (Tr., 
Vol. I, p.198, Ls.20-23.) The prosecutor went on to describe those conversations 
in which Koch "talked to [C.C.] often about the relationship [he] had with his wife," 
"things about their sex life, about their private life, and what they fought over." 
(Tr., Vol. I, p.198, L.24 - p.199, L.7.) This portion of the opening statement 
previewed C.C.'s later trial testimony, in which C.C. testified that Koch told her 
that "he did not enjoy the way that [his wife] would give him a blow job, oral sex," 
and that he would watch a particular pornographic movie with his wife because 
"she would get turned on." (Tr., Vol. I, p.304, L.2 - p.305, L.1 0.) 
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The prosecutor's statements were not improper and were within the 
latitude afforded to attorneys during opening statements. The prosecutor's 
characterization of Koch's grooming behavior and sexually explicit conversations 
as inappropriate, and as something Koch "should have never shared with a 13-
year old girl," did not constitute impeachment or an argument regarding the 
merits of the case. Instead, the prosecutor stated a broadly held societal view 
regarding the appropriateness of sexually explicit conversations with children in 
the context of her summary of the evidence supporting the state's theory of the 
case - that Koch groomed C.C. for sexual abuse, in part by engaging her in 
inappropriate and explicit sexual conversations. I n other words, the prosecutor 
posited that Koch "should never have" engaged in such grooming behavior with 
C.C. because it ultimately led to his commission of the charged conduct in this 
case. 
Because the prosecutor's opening statement was not improper, Koch has 
failed to show that the district court abused its discretion in overruling his 
objection. 
C. Even If The Prosecutor's Statement Was Improper, Any Error Is Harmless 
An error is harmless if the appellate court is able to say, beyond a 
reasonable doubt, that the jury would have reached the same result absent the 
error." State v. Lopez, 141 Idaho 575, 578, 114 P.3d 133, 136 (Ct. App. 2005) 
(citing State v. Boman, 123 Idaho 947, 950-51, 854 P.2d 290, 293-94 (Ct. App. 
1993)). 
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In this case, even if the prosecutor's characterization of Koch's grooming 
behavior and sexually explicit conversations with C.C. as inappropriate and 
something Koch "should have never shared with a 13-year old girl" was improper, 
the statement was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Whether or not it was 
appropriate for Koch to engage in sexually explicit discussion with C.C. was not a 
contested matter at trial. Koch denied even engaging in such conversation. (Tr., 
Vol. II, p.175, Ls.1-6.) This case ultimately turned on the credibility of C.C. and 
Koch, not on the social acceptability of Koch's grooming behavior. The jury 
would not have made different credibility determinations, and would not have 
acquitted Koch, if the prosecutor refrained from negatively characterizing Koch's 
grooming behavior. Additionally, the jury was instructed that the attorneys' 
opening statements did not constitute evidence. (Tr., Vol. I, p.184, Ls.1-3.) 
Even if this Court concludes that the district court abused its discretion in 
overruling Koch's objection to the prosecutor's negative characterization of 
Koch's grooming behaviors, such error was harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt. This Court should therefore affirm Koch's convictions. 
III. 
Koch Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Discretion In 
Overruling Koch's Foundation Objection To The Admission Of Testimony 
Describing Several Text And Email Messages 
A. Introduction 
Koch contends that the district court abused its discretion in overruling his 
foundation objections to testimony describing various text and email messages 
sent by Koch to C.C. and C.C's mother. (Appellant's brief, pp.11-15, 19-21.) 
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Koch's contention fails because the record reveals that the state satisfied 
evidentiary foundation requirements in each instance through testimony from 
C.C. and her mother, who were both able to identify Koch as the sender of the 
messages. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The trial court has broad discretion in the admission and exclusion of 
evidence and its decision to admit or exclude evidence will be reversed only 
when there has been a clear abuse of that discretion. State v. Howard, 135 
Idaho 727,721,24 P.3d 44,48 (2001); State v. Robinett, 141 Idaho 110,112, 
106 P.3d 436,438 (2005). 
C. The State Laid Adequate Foundation For The Admission Of The 
Challenged Text And Email Messages 
Foundation for evidence is governed by Idaho Rule of Evidence 901, 
which provides: 
The requirement of authentication or identification as a condition 
precedent to admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient to 
support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent 
claims. 
I.R.E. 901 (a). By way of illustration, the rule further provides that the foundation 
requirements can be met through "[t]estimony of a witness with knowledge that a 
matter is what it is claimed to be." I.R.E. 901 (b)(1). 
In this case, the state laid adequate foundation for testimony describing 
three sets of messages challenged by Koch on appeal - Koch's text messages 
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sent to C.C's mother, Koch's email messages sent to C.C., and Koch's text 
messages sent to C.C. 
Prior to testifying about the content of text messages sent to her by Koch, 
C.C.'s mother testified that she had previously received text messages and 
phone calls from Koch on her cell phone. (Tr., Vol. I, p.253, L.10 - p.255, L.18; 
p.259, Ls.12-25.) C.C.'s mother testified Koch's phone number would appear on 
her phone when Koch called. (Tr., Vol. I, p.259, Ls.19-25.) When C.C.'s mother 
subsequently received the text messages in question, she testified the incoming 
phone number was the same as the as the one utilized by Koch when he called. 
(Tr., Vol. I, p.260, Ls.1-12.) Sometime later, after C.C.'s mother obtained a new 
cell phone, she received a text message from a number she did not recognize. 
(Tr., Vol. I, p.263, L.20 - p.264, L.5.) C.C.'s mother testified she responded by 
inquiring as to the identity of the sender, who then identified himself as Michael 
Koch. (Tr., Vol. I, p.264, Ls.6-19.) 
Prior to testifying about the content of emails sent to her by Koch, C.C. 
testified that she was familiar with Koch's email address because it was identified 
within her email account contact list as belonging to Koch. (Tr., Vol. I, p.336, 
L.22 - p.337, L.17.) Koch possessed C.C.'s email address, C.C. explained, 
because Salina Koch, Michael Koch's wife, utilized it for Girl Scout 
communications. (Tr., Vol. I, p.336, L.25 - p.337, L.4.) 
Finally, prior to testifying about the content of text messages sent to her by 
Koch, and prior to the admission of photographs depicting these text messages, 
C.C. testified that she had called and talked with Koch on her phone in the 
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presence of detectives for purposes of the investigation into Koch's conduct. 
(Tr., Vol. I, p.358, L.1 - p.359, L.2.) When C.C. called Koch again several days 
later, utilizing the same phone number that she had used previously to contact 
Koch, the call went to Koch's voicemail. (Tr., Vol. I, p.359, L.25 - p.360, L.20.) 
C.C. then initiated a text message exchange with Koch. (Tr., Vol. I, p.361, Ls.1-
6.) C.C. identified state's exhibit 17 as photographs depicting the text messages 
contained in that exchange. (Tr., Vol. I, 361, L.12 - p.374, L.12.) She also 
identified the two phone numbers displayed on the text messages as hers and 
Koch's, respectively. (Tr., Vol. I, p.365, Ls.7-11.) 
In each of these three instances, the district court properly recognized and 
utilized its discretion to overrule Koch's foundation objections to the text and 
email messages. (Tr., Vol. I, p.260, Ls.13-21; p.335, L.22 - p.337, L.19; p.363, 
L.8 - p.364, L.2.) Contrary to Koch's apparent contention below and on appeal 
(Tr., Vol. I, p.260, Ls.16-19; p.336, Ls.6-9;· p.363, Ls.14-22; Appellant's brief, 
p.13), the state was not required to present eyewitness testimony from 
individuals who actually observed Koch at the other end of the text and email 
exchanges. It was sufficient for foundational purposes that C.C. and C.C.'s 
mother testified that they recognized Koch's phone number and email address, 
and that the content of those communications led both to believe that they were 
communicating with Koch. 
On appeal, Koch relies on State v. Harris, 358 S.W.3d 172 (Mo. Ct. App. 
2011), in which the Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's exclusion 
of text messages on foundational grounds. (Appellant's brief, p.14.) Koch 
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argues, "[t]here [in State v. Harris], like here, the foundation for the offered text 
messages came solely through the testimony of the recipient.") (Appellant's 
brief, p.14.) However, the Missouri Court of Appeals did not hold that adequate 
foundation for the admission of text messages requires some type of admission 
from both the sender and recipient of the message. Instead, the Court 
recognized that "[s]uch proof [establishing adequate foundation] could even be 
established by the person receiving the message testifying that he regularly 
receives text messages from the author from this number, or something 
distinctive about the text message indicating the author wrote it, such as a 
personalized signature." Harris, 358 S.W.3d at 175. 1 This is precisely what 
happened in this case. C.C. and C.C.'s mother were familiar with Koch, his 
phone number, and his email address, from their prior contacts with him. This 
knowledge, combined with the nature of the content of the communications 
constituted adequate foundation for the admission of the evidence. 
The state laid adequate foundation for the admission of testimony 
describing the challenged text and email messages. Koch has therefore failed to 
show that the district court abused its discretion in overruling his objection to this 
evidence. 
1 See also State v. Thompson, 777 N.W.2d 617, 622-626 (N.D. 2010) (holding 
that adequate foundation for the admission of testimony about the context of text 
messages could be laid entirely through testimony of the text message recipient). 
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IV. 
Koch Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Discretion In 
Overruling Koch's Relevance Objections 
A. Introduction 
Koch contends that the district court abused its discretion by admitting 
certain evidence at trial on relevance grounds. (Appellant's brief, pp.16, 22.) 
Specifically, Koch contends that the court erred by admitting C.C.'s testimony 
that Koch graphically described aspects of his sex life to her, and admitting 
Salina Koch's testimony that she had expressed her belief to Meridian Detective 
Christopher McGilvery that her husband would not have "done anything" if he 
had been happy in their marriage. (Appellant's brief, pp.16, 22.) 
The record reveals that the challenged testimony regarding Koch's 
discussion of sexual matters with C.C. was relevant to the crimes charged. 
Further, Koch failed to preserve his relevance challenge to Salina Koch's 
testimony about her interview with Detective McGilvery. Koch has therefore 
failed to show that the district court abused its discretion in admitting the 
challenged testimony. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The trial court has broad discretion in the admission and exclusion of 
evidence and its decision to admit or exclude evidence will be reversed only 
when there has been a clear abuse of that discretion. Howard, 135 Idaho at 721, 
24 P.3d at48; Robinett, 141 Idaho at 112,106 P.3d at 438. 
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C. The Challenged Evidence Was Relevant 
To be admissible, evidence must be relevant. I.R.E. 401, 402. Evidence 
that tends to prove the existence of a fact of consequence in the case, and has 
any tendency to make the existence of that fact more probable than it would be 
without the evidence is relevant. State v. Hocker, 115 Idaho 544, 547, 768 P.2d 
807, 810 (Ct. App. 1989). 
The general rule in Idaho is that an appellate court will not consider an 
alleged error on appeal in the absence of a timely objection at trial. State v. 
Norton, 151 Idaho 176, 181, 254 P.3d 77, 82 (Ct. App. 2011); State v. 
Thompson, 132 Idaho 628,634,977 P.2d 890, 896 (1999). "An objection on one 
ground will not preserve a separate and different basis for excluding the 
evidence." State v. Vondenkamp, 141 Idaho 878, 885, 119 P.3d at 660, 653 (Ct. 
App. 2005) (citing State v. Norton, 134 Idaho 875, 880, 11 P.3d 494, 499 (Ct. 
App. 2000); State v. Enyeart, 123 Idaho 452,454,849 P.2d 125, 127 (Ct. App. 
1993)). 
1. Evidence That Koch Engaged In Explicit Discussion With C.C. 
About His Sex Life Was Relevant 
At trial, C. C. testified that Koch engaged her in explicit conversation about 
his sex life with his wife. (Tr., Vol. I, p.302, L.22 - p.305, L.10.) Specifically, C.C. 
testified that Koch told her that he did not like the way his wife performed oral sex 
on him. (Tr., Vol. I, p.304, Ls.6-17.) The district court overruled Koch's 
relevance objection to this testimony. (Tr., Vol. I, p.304, Ls.9-11.) 
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On appeal, Koch contends that this evidence was not relevant because 
"[w]hether or not Mr. Koch enjoyed his wife's oral sex techniques has nothing to 
do with whether he engaged in the acts alleged in the Indictment." (Appellant's 
brief, p.16.) Koch's argument is misguided. The relevance of this testimony 
does not stem from Koch's opinions about his wife's oral sex techniques, but 
from the very fact that Koch engaged in such sexually explicit conversation with 
C.C. These explicit conversations, along with Koch purchasing underwear for 
C.C., and expressing his love for her, constituted evidence of Koch's grooming of 
C.C. for sexual abuse. Evidence of such grooming behavior is relevant to the 
charged conduct in that it constitutes a "continuing criminal design to cultivate a 
relationship with [the victim] such that she would concede to his sexual 
demands." State v. Truman, 150 Idaho 714,722,249 P.3d 1169, 1177 (Ct. App. 
2011 ). 
Because Koch's explicit sexual conversations with C.C. were relevant to 
the charges against him, Koch has failed to show that the district court abused its 
discretion in overruling his relevance objection to the testimony. 
2. Koch Failed To Preserve His Relevance Challenge To Evidence 
That His Wife Told The Detective That Koch "Wouldn't Have Done 
Anything" If He Had Been Happy In His Marriage 
At trial, the state cross-examined Koch's wife, Salina, about her interview 
with Detective McGilvery. (Tr., Vol. I, p.638, L.14 - p.671, L.18.) In the course of 
that cross-examination, the prosecutor asked Salina about her statements to the 
detective that she was responsible for Koch's actions because if Koch had been 
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happy in their marriage, then "he wouldn't have done anything." (Tr., Vol. I, 
p.664, LA - p.666, L.g.) 
Koch made two objections over the course of the challenged portion of 
this cross-examination. Koch first objected on the grounds that the state's 
question was vague. (Tr., Vol., I, p.664, Ls.13-15.) Koch then made a generic 
objection without specifying a ground, after which he requested a sidebar with 
the court. (Tr., Vol. I, p.665, Ls.18-22.) The district court overruled both 
objections. (T., Vol. I, p.664, L.13 - p.665, L.21.) Koch did not object to any of 
the state's questioning or elicited testimony on relevance grounds, therefore, the 
district court did not have the opportunity to rule on the relevance of this 
evidence. Koch has therefore failed to preserve his challenge to the relevance of 
this testimony. 
Even if Koch had preserved this relevance objection, the challenge fails 
because the testimony in question was relevant to the charged conduct. Salina's 
statements to the interviewing detective pOinted to a potential motive for, or 
reasoning behind, Koch's criminal conduct - that he was unhappy in his 
marriage. 
Koch failed to preserve any relevance objection to Salina Koch's 
testimony that she told Detective McGlivery that she felt responsible for Koch's 
actions in that Koch would "not have done anything" had he been happy in their 
marriage. I n any event, such evidence was relevant, and Koch has thus failed to 
show that the district court abused its discretion in admitting the testimony. 
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V. 
Koch Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Discretion In 
Overruling Koch's Objections That Certain Testimony Was Non-Responsive 
A. Introduction 
Koch contends that the district abused its discretion in overruling his 
objections that certain trial witness responses to questioning was non-
responsive. (Appellant's brief, pp.17-19, 21-22.) Koch's contention fails because 
the record reveals that the district court did not abuse its discretion in overruling 
these objections. 
B. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion In Overruling Koch's 
Objections 
Idaho Rule of Evidence 611 provides that the "court shall exercise 
reasonable control over the mode and order of interrogating witnesses .. ,," 
Exercise of this control is a question of discretion. State v. Hairston, 133 Idaho 
496, 503, 988 P.2d 1170, 1177 (1999); State v. Johnson, 132 Idaho 726, 729, 
979 P.2d 128,131 (Ct. App. 1999). 
1. C.C's Reasons For Not Attending The Charter School 
At trial, the following exchange occurred during the state's direct 
examination of C.C.: 
Q: 
A: 
Okay. So other than with the exception of 
finishing up Girl Scouts, did you - did you ever 
even see the defendant again? 
No. I even wouldn't go to Renaissance High 
School, the high school I had gotten into, 
because -
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Defense Counsel: Objection. Your Honor 
Court: Overruled. 





Did - what was that you were saying about -
I had been accepted along with T.K. into 
Renaissance High School and I didn't go there, 
I chose not to go because I didn't want to see 
them. I didn't want to see Michael or T.K. or 
Salina. 
(Tr., Vol. I, p.333, L.12 - p.334, L.3.) 
At the next break in the trial, the district court explained that it overruled 
Koch's non-responsive objection because such an objection cannot be raised by 
the nonquestioning party. (Tr., Vol. I, p.342, Ls.9-19.) The court provided both 
parties with an excerpt from the Idaho Trial Handbook, which cited State ex reI. 
Rich v. Bair, 83 Idaho 475,365 P.2d 261 (1961), for this proposition. (R., p.112, 
n.4, Attachment A; Tr., Vol. I, p.342, Ls.14-19.) Koch subsequently filed a 
document entitled, "Authority In Support of Defendant's Use Of The 'Non-
Responsive Objection," in which he argued that the district court's ruling was 
incorrect. (R., pp.111-117.) The next day, prior to the resumption of the trial, the 
district court rejected Koch's invitation to revisit its ruling. (Tr., Vol. I, p.499, LS.3-
21.) 
The district court's ruling did not constitute an abuse of discretion. In Rich, 
83 Idaho at 219-220, 365 P.2d at 480-481, the Idaho Supreme Court explained 
the reasoning behind the "general rule" that the non-responsive objection is 
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available only to the questioning party: "The reason for the rule is to avoid 
unnecessary interruptions by opposing counsel and to allow counsel conducting 
the examination to control the interrogation." 
The present case illustrates the reasoning behind this general rule. C.C.'s 
response to the prosecutor's question regarding whether C.C. ever saw the 
defendant again was not directly responsive. However, even if the district court 
had sustained Koch's objection and struck C.C.'s response, the prosecutor could 
have simply asked another question to elicit the same information. In such an 
instance, Koch's objection would have only served to interfere with the 
prosecution's direct examination, which was the concern expressed by the Idaho 
Supreme Court in Rich. Koch did not object to the content of C.C.'s response on 
any other specific grounds, or raise any concern about any improper impact of 
C.C.'s response on the jury. 
Further, in this particular case, the district court clearly sought to "avoid 
unnecessary interruption" by Koch's defense counsel and to "allow [the 
prosecutor] conducting the examination to control the interrogation." Later in the 
trial, the district court made a finding that the excessive number of objections and 
requested sidebars initiated by Koch's defense counsel over the course of the 
trial were "interposed for nothing more than to interrupt the flow of testimony." 
(Tr., Vol. I, p.683, L.10 - p.687, L.21.) The district court acted within its 
discretion to attempt to limit Koch's interruptions where there was no clear 
violation of the Idaho Rules of Evidence and no risk of unfair prejudice to Koch. 
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On appeal, Koch contends that the district court abused its discretion 
because its "assertion that the nonquestioning party can never make a non-
responsive objection goes too far." (Appellant's brief, p .18.) However, the record 
reveals that the district court was aware that the Rich non-responsiveness rule 
was merely general, and that it itself retained discretion as to its rulings when 
such objections were made. The court stated that the Rich rule applies in 
"almost every instance". (Tr., Vol. I, p.499, Ls.13-21.) Further, the very Idaho 
Trial Handbook excerpt provided to the parties by the district court also referred 
to the Rich rule as a "general rule." (R., p.117.) 
The district court properly exercised its discretion in overruling Koch's non-
responsiveness objection. Koch has therefore failed to show that the district 
court abused its discretion. 
2. C.C.'s Statements On Cross-Examination Regarding Her Activities 
Following The First Time She Had Sex With Koch 
The following exchange took place during Koch's counsel's cross-
examination of C.C.: 
Q: And you testified when you allegedly had sex the first time, it 
was on the bed. And then you were upset and your 
testimony was that [Koch] told you to go take a bath. So you 
were laying on the bathroom floor and crying? 
A: No. He told me to go take a bath in T.K.'s bedroom because 
he's very adamant about douching and things after you have 
sex, so-
(Tr., Vol. I, p.423, Ls.18-25.) The district court overruled Koch's motion to strike 
C.C.'s answer as non-responsive. (Tr., Vol. I, p.424, Ls.1-7.) 
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C.C.'s answer was responsive to Koch's defense counsel's question. 
Defense counsel asked C.C. if she lied down on the floor and cried after she had 
sex with Koch. C.C. did not refuse to answer the question - she responded in 
the negative. While C.C. then provided testimony regarding what she was doing 
instead and why she was doing it, Koch did not object to the content of this 
testimony on relevance or any other grounds. Because C.C.'s answer was 
responsive to Koch's counsel's question, the district court did not abuse its 
discretion by overruling Koch's objection. 
Even if the district court abused its discretion in declining to strike C.C.'s 
testimony, any such error was harmless. An error is harmless if the appellate 
court is able to say, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the jury would have 
reached the same result absent the error." Lopez, 141 Idaho at 578, 114 P.3d at 
136 (citing Boman, 123 Idaho at 950-51, 854 P.2d at 293-94.) In this case, 
C.C.'s testimony that Koch told her to take a bath and that he was concerned 
about hygiene was rather innocuous, especially in light of other admitted 
testimony regarding Koch's sexual activities with C.C. Additionally, the state had 
already elicited similar information in its direct examination of C.C., and Koch's 
counsel's himself referenced the bath in his own question. (Tr., Vol. I, p.322, 
Ls.17-19; p.423, Ls.19-21.) This Court can find beyond a reasonable doubt that 
the jury would have convicted Koch even without C.C.s's testimony about her 
activities after having sex with Koch. 
The district court acted within its discretion to exercise reasonable control 
over the mode and order of interrogation when it overruled Koch's non-
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responsiveness objection. Koch has therefore failed to establish error. Even if 
the district court did abuse its discretion, any such error was harmless. 
VI. 
Koch Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Discretion In Ruling 
That Detective McGilvery's Testimony Regarding His Interview With Salina Koch 
Was Inconsistent With Koch's Prior Testimony 
A. Introduction 
Koch contends that the district court abused its discretion by overruling 
certain objections he made during the state's direct examination of Detective 
McGilvery. (Appellant's brief, pp.22-23.) Specifically, he contends that the 
district court abused its discretion in overruling his objections to Detective 
McGilvery's testimony about Salina Koch's expressed suspicion about her 
husband's conduct. (Id.) Koch contends that this exchange did not constitute 
proper impeachment because Detective McGilvery's challenged testimony was 
not inconsistent with Salina's earlier trial testimony. (Id.) 
A review of the record reveals that Detective McGilvery's testimony 
regarding Salina's suspicions was inconsistent with her trial testimony, during the 
course of which she appeared to champion her husband's innocence. Koch has 
therefore failed to show that the district court abused its discretion. Further, even 
if the district court erred in overruling Koch's objections, any such error was 
harmless. 
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B. Standard Of Review 
The trial court has broad discretion in the admission and exclusion of 
evidence and its decision to admit or exclude evidence will be reversed only 
when there has been a clear abuse of that discretion. Howard, 135 Idaho at 721, 
24 P.3d at 48; Robinett, 141 Idaho at 112, 106 P.3d at 438. 
C. Detective McGilvery's Challenged Testimony Was Inconsistent With 
Salina Koch's 
Idaho Rule of Evidence 607 states, "The credibility of a witness may be 
attacked by any party including the party calling the witness." Prior inconsistent 
statements, which are governed by I.R.E. 613, constitute non-hearsay 
statements which may be elicited for impeachment purposes. See Small v. 
State, 132 Idaho 327,334-35,971 P.2d 1151, 1158-59 (Ct. App. 1998). 
At trial in this case, the state called Koch's wife, Salina, as a witness. (Tr., 
Vol. I, p.629, L.21 - p.630, L.5.) The prosecutor questioned Salina about a 
recorded interview she participated in with Detective McGilvery. (Tr., Vol. I, 
p.638, L.14 - p.671, L.12.) The prosecutor asked Salina if she had made various 
specific statements to Detective McGilvery. (Id.) Salina admitted making some 
of the statements, denied making others, and claimed not to remember making 
others. (Id.) 
The exchange was occasionally contentious, and the district court 
declared Salina to be a hostile witness. (Tr., Vol. I, p.638, Ls.6-9.) Salina 
appeared to attempt to support her husband. She denied that C.C. and her 
husband had a "very close relationship." (Tr., Vol. I, p.647, Ls.14-17.) She also 
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appeared to accuse C.C. of attempting to initiate some type of romantic 
encounter with Koch, in testifying that she had seen C.C. "petting" Koch's foot 
with her hand, and that Koch "does not know when a woman or anyone has any 
interest in him." (Tr., Vol. I, p.667, L.3 - p.668, L.1; p.671, Ls.6-12; p.672, L.23-
p.673, L.22.) At one point Salina blurted out that her "husband is innocent," after 
which she was admonished by the district court, which struck the statement. (Tr., 
Vol. I, p.666, Ls.12-23.) When the prosecutor asked Salina if she recalled telling 
Detective McGilvery that she was responsible for what happened, Salina 
responded that she "was very upset and confused." (Tr., Vol. I, p.664, L.9 -
p.665, L.21.) Then, Salina admitted that she told Detective McGilvery that had 
Koch been happy in their marriage, then he "wouldn't have done anything." (Tr., 
Vol. I, p.666, Ls.4-9.) 
The state expressed its intention to attempt to admit the recording of 
Detective McGilvery's interview with Salina. (Tr., Vol. I, p.655, Ls.6-16; p.688, 
Ls.2-11; p.712, L.23 - p.713, L.10.) Initially, the district court indicated that it 
would admit portions of Detective McGilvery's interview of Salina as substantive 
evidence because Salina had testified that she had recently listened to a 
recording of the interview and it had not refreshed her recollection as to certain 
topics. (Tr., Vol. I, p.651, Ls.1-8; p.655, Ls.17-20; p.688, L.24 - p.689, L.5; 
p.714, L.17 - p.715, L.9.) However, after reviewing the recording, the district 
court elected not to admit the recording itself as substantive evidence, but to 
instead permit the state to call Detective McGilvery to testify about the interview, 
to the extent Salina's interview statements were inconsistent with her trial 
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testimony. (Tr., Vol. II, p.21, L.3 - p.24, L.11.) The district court instructed the 
jury that Detective McGilvery's testimony regarding Salina's interview statements 
were to be considered only for the purpose of impeaching Salina's prior trial 
testimony, and not for the truth of any matter asserted. (Tr., Vol. II, p.41, Ls.19 -
25.) 
Detective McGilvery then testified about his interview with Salina. (Tr., 
Vol. II, p.38, L.17 - p.58, L.13.) Relevant to Koch's appellate challenge, the state 
elicited testimony from Detective McGilvery regarding Salina's previously held 
suspicions of her husband's guilt. Detective McGilvery answered in the 
affirmative in response to the prosecutor's question about "whether or not 
[Salina] recalled talking to [C. C.] about her concerns that something was going 
on between [C.C.] and [Koch]." (Tr., Vol. II, p.43, L.19 - p.44, L.8.) Additionally, 
after the prosecutor asked Detective McGilvery whether he "ask[ed] Salina in 
particular if she believed there was something wrong in the relationship [between 
Koch and C.C.]," Detective McGilvery responded that "[Salina] had suspicions 
that something was going on, but she wasn't for sure what." (Tr., Vol. II, p.44, 
L.24 - p.45, L.11.) The district court overruled Koch's objection to this testimony. 
(Tr., Vol. II, p.43, Ls.24-25; p.45, Ls.3-4.) 
Detective McGilvery's testimony about Salina's vague expressed 
suspicions about Koch was admissible because it was inconsistent with Salina's 
prior testimony. The state was entitled to contrast the support Salina expressed 
for Koch during her trial testimony, and her testimony that she was "upset and 
confused" during the interview with Detective McGilvery, with evidence of her 
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previously-held suspicions about her husband, and with her ability to clearly 
express these suspicions to Detective McGilvery despite her allegedly confused 
state. 
The district court properly overruled Koch's objections because Detective 
McGilvery's testimony about Salina's expressed suspicions of Koch's conduct 
was inconsistent with Salina's prior testimony. Koch has therefore failed to show 
that the district court abused its discretion in admitting the testimony. 
D. Even If The Admission Of The Testimony Constituted Error, Any Such 
Error Was Harmless 
Even if the district court abused its discretion by declining to overrule 
Koch's objections to portions of Detective McGilvery's testimony, such error was 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Significantly, the district court provided the jury with a limiting instruction 
regarding Detective McGilvery's testimony about his interview with Salina. The 
district court instructed the jury that the testimony was not to be considered for 
the truth of any matter asserted. (Tr., Vol. II, p.41, Ls.19-25.) Because this Court 
must "presume that the jury followed the jury instructions given by the trial court," 
State v. Carson, 151 Idaho 713, 718, 264 P.3d 54, 59 (2011) (citation omitted), it 
must also presume that the jury in this case utilized Detective McGilvery's 
challenged testimony only as impeachment evidence. The matter of the 
credibility of Salina, who was not an eyewitness to any of the charged conduct, 
was not a central issue at trial. 
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Further, evidence that Salina expressed some suspicion of Koch to 
Detective McGilvery was not so inflammatory or prejudicial as to warrant a 
vacating of Koch's conviction. The basis of Salina's suspicion was not developed 
at trial, aside from Salina's own explanation that the interviewing officers told her 
that they had "100% proof" of Koch's guilt, that Koch may have been unhappy in 
the marriage, and she was "upset and confused" when she expressed these 
suspicions. (Tr., VoL I, p.664, L.4-p.665, L.21; p.670, L.4-p.671, L.12.) 
Koch has failed to show that the district court abused its discretion in 
overruling his objection to portions of Detective McGilvery's testimony describing 
his interview with Salina Koch. Even if the district court did abuse its discretion, 
any such error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
VII. 
Koch Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Discretion In 
Overruling Koch's Foundation Objection To The Admission Of An Audio 
Recording Of The Confrontation Call 
A. Introduction 
Koch contends that the district court abused its discretion in overruling his 
foundation objection to the admission of an audio recording of the confrontation 
call between himself and C.C. (Appellant's brief, pp.24-26.) Koch has failed to 
show error because a review of the record reveals that the state presented 
adequate foundation for the evidence. 
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B. Standard Of Review 
The trial court has broad discretion in the admission and exclusion of 
evidence and its decision to admit or exclude evidence will be reversed only 
when there has been a clear abuse of that discretion. Howard, 135 Idaho at 721, 
24 P.3d at 48; Robinett, 141 Idaho at 112,106 P.3d at 438. 
C. The State Laid Proper Foundation For Admission Of The Audio Recording 
Of The Confrontation Call 
As discussed above, foundation for evidence is governed by Idaho Rule of 
Evidence 901, which provides: 
The requirement of authentication or identification as a condition 
precedent to admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient to 
support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent 
claims. 
I.R.E. 901 (a). The foundation requirements can be met through U[t]estimony of a 
witness with knowledge that a matter is what it is claimed to be." I.R.E. 
901 (b)(1). 
In this case, prior to the admission of the audio recording of the 
confrontation call between C.C. and Koch, the state elicited testimony from 
Detective McGilvery, who facilitated the call. (Tr., Vol. II, p.29, L.1 - p.35, L.2.) 
Detective McGilvery testified that he was physically present with C.C. when C.C. 
made the call to Koch, and that he reviewed state's exhibit 19 and confirmed it to 
be an audio recording of that phone call. (Tr., Vol. II, p.32, L.2 - p.33, L.24.) He 
also testified that C.C. used her own phone to make the call, which demonstrated 
that C.C. knew how to get into contact with Koch. (Tr., Vol. II, p.32, Ls.13-16.) 
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Earlier in the trial, C.C. testified that she participated in the confrontation call 
during which she was able to speak with Koch. (Tr., Vol. I, p.358, L.1 - p.365, 
L.3.) This evidence constituted sufficient foundation for the admission of the 
audio recording of the phone call. 
The state laid adequate foundation for the admission of an audio recording 
of the conformation call between C.C. and Koch. Koch has therefore failed to 
show that the district court abused its discretion in admitting this evidence. 
VIII. 
Koch Has Failed To Show Cumulative Error 
"The cumulative error doctrine requires reversal of a conviction when there 
is an accumulation of irregularities, each of which by itself might be harmless, but 
when aggregated, the errors show the absence of a fair trial, in contravention of 
the defendant's constitutional right to due process." State v. Draper, 151 Idaho 
576,594,261 P.3d 853, 871 (2011) (citations, quotations and alteration omitted). 
A necessary predicate to application of the cumulative error doctrine is a finding 
of more than one error. State v. Hawkins, 131 Idaho 396,958 P.2d 22 (Ct. App. 
1998). 
Koch has failed to show any error, much less two or more errors. Thus, 
the doctrine of cumulative error does not apply in this case. See,~, LaBelle v. 
State, 130 Idaho 115, 121, 937 P.2d 427, 433 (Ct. App. 1997). Further, the 
alleged errors in this case do not implicate the central issues of this trial - Koch's 
and C.C.'s credibility. 
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CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the judgment entered 
upon the jury verdicts finding Koch guilty of four counts of lewd conduct with a 
minor under sixteen. 
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